Performance Evaluation Report

Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund, 2009–2024

Independent Evaluation ADB

Raising development impact through evaluation

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NOTES

(i) In this report, "$" refers to United States dollars.
(ii) For an explanation of rating descriptions used in Asian Development Bank evaluation reports, see Asian Development Bank. 2016. *Guidelines for the Evaluation of Public Sector Operations*.

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Abbreviations

ADB	–	Asian Development Bank
APDRF	–	Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund
CCSD	–	Climate Change and Sustainable Development Department
COVID-19	–	coronavirus disease
DEAP	–	Disaster and Emergency Assistance Policy
DMC	–	developing member country
DRM	–	disaster risk management
EAL	–	emergency assistance loan
GCR	–	grant closing report
IED	–	Independent Evaluation Department
PDNA	–	post-disaster needs assessment
UN	–	United Nations
UNICEF	–	United Nations Children's Fund
WFP	–	World Food Programme

Contents

Acknowledgments

This evaluation was prepared by a team of staff and consultants from the Independent Evaluation Department (IED) of the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The team comprised Garrett Kilroy (team leader), Lawrence Nelson Guevara, and Elizabeth Li-Mancenido. Bernard Broughton, Royston Brockman, and Grace Alindogan were the consultants.

The report was prepared under the overall guidance of Emmanuel Jimenez, Director General, IED and Nathan Subramaniam, Director, Sector and Project Division, IED.

Melinda Sutherland, Principal Evaluation Specialist, IED, provided comments at the evaluation approach stage while Nassreena S. Baddiri, Senior Evaluation Specialist, IED and Dorothy Lucks, international consultant—peer reviewed the final draft of the report.

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IED retains full responsibility for this report.

Executive Summary

Evaluation Purpose and Process

The Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund (APDRF) of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), established as a special fund in 2009, aims to provide immediate post-disaster grants to ADB's developing member countries (DMCs) to restore lifesaving services and to help bridge the gap between ADB's hazard mitigation loans and grants and longer-term post-disaster reconstruction assistance.

This evaluation assesses whether the APDRF achieved its objectives in 2009–2024. The evaluation involved desk review of the relevant fund and project documents, including available grant closing reports (GCRs); a portfolio review from 2009 to 2024; interviews with key ADB staff; and short virtual missions to Indonesia, Mongolia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Vanuatu.

Fund Portfolio

The APDRF was established in 2009 with initial funding of $40 million transferred from the Asian Tsunami Fund. This was supplemented by a series of replenishments from ADB's net income: two $20 million replenishments (one in 2015 and a second in 2017), a $10 million replenishment in 2020, and two $15 million replenishments (one in 2021 and one in 2024). In addition, the Government of Japan contributed $75 million in 2020 to be allocated specifically for response to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic; an exemption was approved for this contribution, as the fund only accepts untied contributions that are not subject to any conditions. Japan's contribution for COVID-19 lapsed in May 2022 (it was a 2-year time-bound contribution), with the remainder of $27.25 million then cancelled and transferred to the Japan Fund for Prosperous and Resilient Asia and the Pacific. The total net resources of APDRF totaled $167.75 million as of the end of 2024 (excluding interest income).

During 2009–2024, ADB approved a total of 87 grants, comprising $62.5 million for 38 COVID-19-related grants (44%) and $84.0 million for 49 grants addressing disasters from natural hazards (56%). Two grants were partially or fully cancelled. Non-COVID-19 relief grants averaged just over three per year, disbursing $5.4 million on average. From a regional perspective, the Pacific region received the most grants (43 or 48%), while Southeast Asia received the most assistance ($50.5 million or 34%).

APDRF Guidelines

The quick-disbursing grants, up to $3 million per event, are released to central governments, typically ministries of finance. The implementing guidelines were updated three times as replenishments were made to include retroactive financing (in 2015), support for COVID-19 response (in 2021), and to integrate business processes for a second window of assistance (in 2022). In 2021 a second window was established under the APDRF to finance experts to provide rapid post-disaster technical support for the preparation of post-disaster needs assessments, recovery plans, and post-disaster projects, including emergency assistance loans. Three direct charges have been approved since the financing guidelines for post-disaster needs assessments were issued in 2022. The APDRF allows DMCs to use country procurement systems because of the emergency nature of disasters.

Key Messages

The APDRF remains a useful instrument and is assessed *successful* overall. The grants are well received by DMCs and provide ADB an opportunity to demonstrate solidarity and timely support. The APDRF aims to provide immediate support to restore lifesaving services in the aftermath of a disaster. It also aims to bridge the gap between ADB's disaster risk reduction support and longer-term post-disaster reconstruction lending. However, the practical mechanisms for bridging this gap were minimal until the second window was established. The APDRF focuses on disaster response and spans the continuum of activities between humanitarian relief and early recovery, while ADB's disaster and emergency assistance policy emphasizes disaster preparedness. The APDRF

complements other forms of response—such as repurposing of existing loans, contingent disaster financing, and emergency assistance loans—but this complementarity is not well articulated.

At the grant level, most of the assessed projects were well aligned with identified needs, well targeted, and in line with the APDRF objectives. The APDRF grants have the flexibility to allow DMCs to change how grant funds are applied in response to an evolving emergency without consulting ADB, as long as the APDRF's broad aims to restore lifesaving services are maintained. For most of the mission countries, natural disaster response grants were spent within 6 months. In most cases, the use of the grant proceeds aligns with the purpose of the APDRF. For more chronic events such as health emergencies and slow-onset disasters, the 6-month threshold was sometimes exceeded. Grants that failed to remain within the defined scope provide lessons for future assistance.

The fund establishment paper and the guidelines stress immediacy and rapid disbursement of the APDRF grants, but lack guidance about what this means in practice. The suggested business process timeline does not include explicit targets, but one quarter of grants took more than 12 weeks to disburse, and a third of grants were extended during implementation. The lack of formal implementation monitoring makes it difficult to identify efficiency weaknesses. There is no formal requirement to review progress, address bottlenecks, support DMCs in reconciling expenses, or systematically capture lessons during implementation. These factors also complicate performance assessment at grant closing.

The fund has been replenished from net income for most of its life. ADB has sufficient resources to respond to emergency requests, and the institutional resources for the APDRF are generally sufficient to ensure the funds are processed and disbursed. However, more resources may be required to address efficiency shortcomings. ADB's most recent additional net income replenishment to the APDRF (in 2024) demonstrates the institution's continued commitment, in contrast to other special funds that are no longer supported.

Issues

Delays often cause APDRF grants to be disbursed during early recovery, highlighting the need for better anticipatory coordination to enhance flexibility, effectiveness, and alignment with ADB's broader resilience-building goals. There are differences in focus between the APDRF and ADB's overall disaster risk management approach, reflecting the APDRF's narrow focus on disaster response and ADB's broader remit on risk reduction, preparedness, and response. In practice, APDRF support spans a range of small-scale humanitarian relief and early recovery activities that complement ADB's wider efforts. While DMCs are highly appreciative of APDRF, it is incidental to ADB's country partnership strategies. Better planning with DMCs for the use of the APDRF and actions to mitigate prior or potential causes of delay could improve grant relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency.

The lack of guidance on monitoring the APDRF and its performance targets presents implementation, evaluation, and learning limitations. The fund establishment paper and guidelines both lack clear indicative delivery standards for the APDRF, while the lack of indicative targets makes evaluating grant effectiveness challenging. Improved monitoring and reporting systems could enhance learning for future deployment of the APDRF grants, and wider learning on disaster preparedness, thereby better linking the fund with ADB's Revised Disaster and Emergency Assistance Policy.

Recommendations

1. Consider opportunities to discuss future deployment of the APDRF with relevant developing member countries during country dialogues as part of ADB's wider package of disaster support. At the country and regional levels, ADB should engage with DMCs likely to request assistance, ideally during country partnership strategy preparation, to learn from previous disasters; determine if grant processing, disbursement, and implementation are likely to proceed smoothly; and to identify anticipatory actions and risk mitigation. These discussions should take place where relevant and within the context of ADB's wider package of disaster support, and should be conducted in

collaboration with key agencies and partners to align with existing country and possibly regional (e.g., Pacific Islands) disaster risk management frameworks. The capacity of resident mission staff could be enhanced to address pre-emptive planning with DMCs and better understand APDRF grant use, deployment, implementation, and monitoring.

2. Update the APDRF guidelines to improve performance standards, grant monitoring, reporting, and learning within ADB's purview. ADB should develop appropriate standards for grant processing and disbursement to incentivize improved efficiency within ADB's scope of influence. Metrics for measuring the effectiveness of grants that capture the APDRF's unique characteristics and reflect the full range of disasters addressed by the fund should be considered. The fund's monitoring, reporting, and learning systems should be strengthened, drawing on international best practices. At the grant level, at least one documented progress review led by the resident mission should be planned, following grant disbursement, to support DMCs in making corrections, addressing implementation issues, and capturing lessons that may be included in the GCRs. ADB should follow its implementation guidelines for APDRF and disclose GCRs on the ADB website. At the fund level, APDRF performance and lessons should be reviewed in advance of all fund replenishments.

CHAPTER 1
Introduction

1. This report presents an evaluation of the Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund (APDRF) of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), which is a special fund established in 2009 to provide timely, incremental grant resources to developing member countries (DMCs) to help them cover the initial costs of responding to a major disaster. This introductory chapter presents the objective, scope, and methods used in evaluating ADB's APDRF. Limitations in undertaking the evaluation are also provided.

A. Evaluation Objective, Scope, Methods, and Limitations

2. **Evaluation objective.** ADB Management requested the Independent Evaluation Department (IED) to evaluate the APDRF to assist the ADB Board of Directors in making future fund replenishment decisions. In response, IED prepared an evaluation approach paper to initiate the evaluation of the APDRF.[1] Based on the evaluation approach paper, this evaluation focuses on the extent to which the APDRF, as a whole, has achieved its objectives and contributed to ADB's policies and plans to enhance disaster response and resilience in the Asia and Pacific region. The evaluation also identifies key issues and lessons and provides recommendations for the fund's future direction.

3. **Evaluation scope.** The evaluation of the APDRF examines (i) the fund, including the establishment paper, the guidelines and their revisions, fund replenishments, and institutional aspects; and (ii) APDRF grants and direct charges approved and completed from 2009 (when the fund was established) until the end of 2024.

4. **Evaluation methods.** The evaluation triangulates qualitative and quantitative data collected from various sources using the following methods: (i) an overview of the emergency and disaster-related support provided by ADB; (ii) a review of the guidelines, processes, and practices governing the approval, implementation, reporting, and evaluation of APDRF; (iii) a review of grants for which closing reports have been prepared to assess performance and identify key issues and lessons; (iv) interviews of key concerned ADB staff, including the APDRF focal unit in the Climate Change and Sustainable Development Department (CCSD, formerly the Sustainable Development and Climate Change Department), and project officers involved in the processing and implementation of the APDRF grants; (v) short virtual missions with Indonesia, Mongolia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Vanuatu, which provided a more in-depth assessment of projects, and interviews with key stakeholders including the executing and implementing agencies, and development partners at the country level; and (vi) a comparison with similar funds administered by other development partners highlighting differences, similarities, and best practices.

5. Secondary sources of information included: (i) APDRF institutional documents, including the 2009 APDRF establishment paper;[2] the 2009 APDRF implementing guidelines and subsequent updates (in 2015, 2021, and 2022); and individual grant agreements, grant approval memos, and other related documents available from CCSD; (ii) audit reports and grant closing reports (GCRs); and (iii) 2015 and 2017 performance reviews undertaken by CCSD. Primary sources include key informant interviews with the pertinent ADB staff in headquarters and resident missions, as well as representatives from executing agencies and implementing agencies for completed grants. This evaluation report was prepared using

[1] IED. 2022. *Evaluation Approach Paper: Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund, 2009–2021*.
[2] ADB. 2009. *Establishment of the Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund*. Institutional Document.

the broad structure of a project performance evaluation report in terms of timing and resource input. It follows, in general terms, the evaluation standards set out in ADB's 2016 Guidelines for Evaluation of Public Sector Operations, assessing the fund and portfolio's relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability.[3]

6. **Expected impacts, outcomes, and outputs**. The APDRF does not have a design and monitoring framework, and therefore lacks explicit outcome and impact statements. Nevertheless, some project-level impacts were noted in the 2015 and 2017 performance reviews.[4] This evaluation developed a theory of change (Appendix 1) based on available documentation to capture how the APDRF contributes to overall ADB disaster and emergency assistance and addresses DMCs' resilience from disasters.

7. Based on the 2009 establishment paper, the objective of the APDRF is to provide, in a timely fashion, incremental grant resources to DMCs affected by a natural disaster. The APDRF was envisaged to help bridge the gap between existing ADB arrangements that assist DMCs to reduce disaster risk through hazard mitigation loans and grants, and longer-term post-disaster reconstruction lending. This assistance was to be through quick-disbursing grants that help DMCs in meeting immediate expenses to restore lifesaving services to affected populations following a declared disaster, and in augmenting aid provided by other development partners in times of national crisis (e.g., purchase of water purification and sanitation systems, transitional shelter, personal hygiene kits, emergency communication equipment, and aviation fuel, as well as debris sifting, site clearance, and safe disposal of useless rubble). The APDRF was intended to respond to an urgent need for resources immediately following a disaster, and to be used sparingly with ADB's emergency loan in the absence of such urgency (e.g., if a disaster does not require an immediate response from ADB, or the impacted DMC has sufficient resources to cover the expenses). During 2020–2023, the APDRF was also used to support efforts to address the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic.

8. **Evaluation limitations.** The evaluation of the APDRF was dependent on and limited by the availability of documentation for all approved and closed APDRF grants. GCRs (only required since 2015 and typically short two-page documents) and audit reports are the only documentation available at the grant level following disbursement. There is no requirement for midterm reviews or back-to-office reports, and therefore documentary evidence of implementation issues is limited. To complement the desk review of these limited documents, interviews were undertaken with the concerned ADB staff and missions to selected DMCs representing the different regions, albeit virtually because of COVID-19 restrictions on travel.

B. Structure of the Report

9. Following this Chapter 1 Introduction, Chapter 2 highlights the establishment of the fund and characterizes the APDRF grant portfolio. Chapter 3 assesses the performance of the fund and completed APDRF grants. Finally, Chapter 4 presents conclusions for ADB to consider including issues, lessons, and recommendations for future APDRF operations.

[3] ADB. 2016. *Guidelines for the Evaluation of Public Sector Operations*.
[4] ADB. 2015. *Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund: Review of Performance (April 2009-December 2014)*; and ADB. 2017. *Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund: Review of Performance (January 2015-December 2016)*.

CHAPTER 2

Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund Establishment and Portfolio

A. Strategic Context

10. Disasters present a serious and growing threat to inclusive and sustainable socioeconomic development in Asia and the Pacific because of the increasing exposure of vulnerable populations and the increasing threat from climate change. The region experiences all major types of extreme weather and geophysical events, including tropical cyclones, floods, droughts, landslides, earthquakes, and tsunamis. It dominates disaster impact categories across all regions of the world and experiences a disproportionately large share of global disaster impacts relative to the size of the region's economy and population.[5] From 2004 to 2020, disasters caused 676,924 deaths in ADB's DMCs and affected 2.31 billion people, accounting for 62% of fatalities and 79% of affected people globally. Health emergencies, especially epidemics and pandemics, continue to pose a substantial risk to Asia and the Pacific. Exposure to disaster risk in developing Asia is rising rapidly, in part because of expanding populations and economic development, but also because certain trends—such as the spread of coastal megacities—concentrate people and assets in high-risk locations. Low-lying areas and the region's small island developing states are particularly vulnerable to climate and disaster-related risks.

11. Governments, populations, and the international community increasingly recognize the need to reduce risk and enhance financial preparedness for disasters in countries across developing Asia. The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015–2030 articulates this need and sets out key goals to this end. A midterm review of the Sendai Framework[6] concluded that while some positive steps have been taken—including the Asia-Pacific Action Plan, 2021–2024,[7] and the 2022 Asia-Pacific Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction,[8] which affirmed regional commitment to the Sendai Framework—progress in Asia and the Pacific has been inadequate. There are critical gaps in developing regional and provincial disaster risk reduction plans that are specific to local conditions and hazards. For most Pacific Island countries, more funding is needed to implement disaster risk reduction measures, and the private sector needs to be sensitized to the benefits of risk-informed investments. The midterm review report also highlighted the need for further capacity building for national stakeholders, and for high-quality climate and disaster risk information and data.

12. The APDRF was established to provide immediate financial assistance to affected DMCs as part of the implementation of ADB's Disaster and Emergency Assistance Policy (DEAP). Approved by ADB's Board of Directors in 2004, the DEAP is comprehensive, addressing disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction in addition to disaster prevention, preparation, and impact mitigation.[9] The DEAP seeks

[5] ADB. 2021. *Revised Disaster and Emergency Assistance Policy*.
[6] United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR). 2023. *The Report of the Midterm Review of the Implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030*.
[7] UNDRR. 2021. *Asia-Pacific Action Plan 2021–2024 for Implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030*.
[8] Government of Australia and UNDRR. 2022. *Asia-Pacific Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction: Conference Report*.
[9] ADB. 2004. *Disaster and Emergency Assistance Policy*.

to address disaster and emergency assistance in an integrated manner, covering all aspects of disaster risk management (DRM). A companion DEAP Action Plan was approved in April 2008,[10] and remained in effect for 6 years until the issuance in April 2014 of the Operational Plan for Integrated Disaster Risk Management, 2014–2020.[11] The action plan recommended exploring the provision of a quick-disbursing fund for DMCs affected by a major disaster, which provided the basis for establishment of the APDRF.

13. ADB's focus on disaster risk, disaster resilience, and emergency assistance is constantly evolving. ADB's Strategy 2020 identifies disaster and emergency assistance as one of the areas of operations for ADB, reflecting the considerable challenges that natural hazards pose to development in Asia and the Pacific.[12] The strategy states that ADB will continue to mainstream DRM and provide early and medium-term disaster response and assistance in partnership with specialized aid agencies. The 2004 DEAP was reviewed and revised in 2021 (footnote 5). The revised DEAP provides an updated policy framework to enhance strategic guidance and increase the efficiency and impact of ADB's support to DMCs to strengthen resilience to disasters and emergencies. This includes improved management of residual risk. In 2024 ADB launched its Disaster Risk Management Action Plan, 2024–2030, which aims to strengthen disaster resilience in DMCs.[13]

B. Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund Establishment and Guidelines

14. The APDRF was designed to provide quick-disbursing grants to assist DMCs in meeting immediate expenses and to restore lifesaving services to affected populations following a declared natural disaster. The ADB Board of Directors approved the establishment of the APDRF in April 2009 (footnote 2), 5 years after approval of the DEAP. The APDRF grant allows expenses of up to $3 million per disaster event. In September 2009, ADB approved the first $3 million APDRF grant for the Philippines in response to a disaster caused by a typhoon.[14] The evolution of ADB's APDRF and disaster and emergency assistance policy milestones are presented in Figure 1.

15. As of the end of 2024, the fund had received allocations totaling $167.75 million (excluding interest income and net of the cancelled contribution of $27.25 million from the Government of Japan). Starting in 2009, with $40.00 million transferred from uncommitted resources of the Asian Tsunami Fund,[15] the APDRF was replenished through a number of contributions from ADB's previous year's net income (Appendix 2, Table A2).[16] In May 2020, the Government of Japan contributed $75.00 million specifically earmarked to support the COVID-19 response. This facilitated the approval of 38 COVID-19-related grants amounting to $62.50 million from 2020 to 2024.

[10] ADB. 2008. *Action Plan for Implementing ADB's Disaster and Emergency Assistance Policy*.
[11] ADB. 2014. *Operational Plan for Integrated Disaster Risk Management 2014–2020*.
[12] ADB. 2008. *Strategy 2020: Working for an Asia and Pacific Free of Poverty*.
[13] ADB. 2024. *Disaster Risk Management Action Plan, 2024–2030.*
[14] ADB. Philippines: Typhoon Ketsana (Ondoy) Project.
[15] The specialized Asian Tsunami Fund was established in 2005 to support developing member countries struck by the December 2004 tsunami. The fund provides grant financing from ADB, bilateral partners, and other contributors to support priority rehabilitation and reconstruction needs on a multisector basis.
[16] ADB. 2024. ADB Governors Approve $1.42 Billion in 2023 Allocable Net Income. News release. 5 May.

Figure 1: ADB Disaster and Emergency-Related Policies and APDRF Milestones



ADB = Asian Development Bank, APDRF = Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund, COVID-19 = coronavirus disease, DEAP = Disaster and Emergency Assistance Policy, EAL = Emergency Assistance Loan; OP3 = Operational Priority 3, PHI = Philippines.
[a] Grant 0685-PHI: COVID-19 Emergency Response.
Source: ADB (Independent Evaluation Department).

16. The implementation guidelines and arrangements for the APDRF were initially issued in 2009,[17] and have been updated several times: in 2015 to permit retroactive financing, and to improve and streamline business processes, including through the development of templates; [18] and in 2022, integrating the business process and fund disbursement for the second window that was established in 2021.[19] The approval process for the APDRF grants involves multiple levels within the ADB and external confirmation from the United Nations (UN) humanitarian and/or resident coordinator. The Disaster Risk Management Unit of the Climate Change, Resilience, and Environment Cluster manages the fund, coordinating with other ADB departments and external contributors. Eligibility for the fund is broad, allowing any DMC to access the APDRF in the event of a disaster. Conditions for assistance have become more flexible (para. 35), and eligible items for funding include emergency rescue equipment, medical kits, and water purification systems. Retroactive financing has been allowed since 2015 for up to 30% of total grant proceeds. Disbursement of the APDRF funds is expected within 24 hours upon receipt of the signed grant agreement and withdrawal application. The procurement process promotes the use of country systems for emergency response. A detailed description of the APDRF processes and eligibility is presented in Appendix 2.

17. The second window of assistance established in 2021 was intended to finance experts to provide speedy technical support for the preparation of post-disaster needs assessments (PDNAs), recovery plans, and post-disaster projects.[20] It also enables ADB to participate more consistently in PDNAs as part of a multi-donor team and support the timely processing and start-up of emergency assistance loans (EALs).

[17] ADB. 2009. *Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund: Implementation Guidelines.*
[18] ADB. 2015. *Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund: Implementation Guidelines.*
[19] ADB. 2022. *Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund: Implementation Guidelines.*
[20] ADB. 2021. *Establishment of a Second Window of Assistance under the Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund.*

The second window is not designed to finance any technical support needs arising during the post-disaster project implementation.

C. Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund Portfolio, 2009–2024

18. The APDRF portfolio includes both natural disasters and health emergencies related to the COVID-19 pandemic during 2020–2022. The majority of funds for natural disasters were focused on public sector management and agriculture, which is consistent with the needs of governments to respond to natural disasters through public service mechanisms, and to rapidly re-establish food supplies. COVID-19-related grants account for 44% of total APDRF grants by number and 43% in terms of amount approved, while traditional grants for disasters caused by natural hazards represent 56% in number and 57% in amount approved (Figure 2). The ability of the fund to reorient to the global health pandemic resulted in a spike of health-emergency grants in 2020 (Figure 3) and is consistent with the value of having a quick-dispersing approval mechanism, tailored to disaster response. Further breakdown of the APDRF portfolio is provided in Appendix 3.

Figure 2: Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund Grants, 2009–2024



Note: Excluding direct charges.
Source: Asian Development Bank (Climate Change and Sustainable Development Department).

Figure 3: ADB's Annual Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund Approvals, 2009–2024



ADB = Asian Development Bank, COVID-19 = coronavirus disease.
Source: ADB (Climate Change and Sustainable Development Department).

CHAPTER 3

Performance Assessment

19. ADB Management's performance reviews in 2015 and 2017 assessed the fund *successful*, noting its timely and flexible disbursement of grants. However, the fund has not been independently evaluated, and GCRs are not publicly available. This chapter assessment the APDRF's performance in terms of the fund and portfolio's relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability. This is anchored on the evaluation's overarching question: to what extent has the APDRF, as a whole, achieved its objectives and contributed to ADB's policies and plans to enhance disaster response and resilience in Asia and the Pacific?

A. Relevance

20. APDRF is welcomed by DMCs, and its grants can provide an entry point for subsequent targeted recovery and reconstruction investments, which often incorporate resilience and fit more closely with ADB's disaster-related policies. The 2021 second window to support PDNAs should potentially provide a stronger link with follow-on investments, but regardless of such linkages, the relationship-building, goodwill, and early engagement opportunity these grants provide were identified as strengths of the APDRF during consultations with DMCs and stakeholders more generally. It is reasonable to conclude that APDRF grants align with DMC priorities because (i) they are provided in response to a DMC request for assistance, (ii) the purpose is very broadly stated in the grant agreement (in Schedule 1), and (iii) there is considerable flexibility in how DMCs actually deploy the funds. Evidence from consultations with government agencies suggests that response to disasters has remained a top priority among DMCs.

21. The number of grants awarded was greatest for the most vulnerable countries (those with concessional funding) but the volume of support was higher for less vulnerable countries. ADB DMCs that are classified in need of greatest concessionality and are eligible for Asian Development Fund grants (group A, or concessional assistance only) received almost half of the total number of approved APDRF grants and direct charges (47%). This was followed by countries that need some concessionality (group B, or ordinary capital resources blend) with 25 APDRF grants (28%), while ADB DMCs that need least concessionality (group C, or regular ordinary capital resources) accounted for 23 APDRF grants and direct charges (25%). In terms of amount approved, DMCs classified under group A received slightly less ($47 million or 32%) than those in groups B or C. Group C received $48 million (32%) while group B ($52 million or 36%) or group C received ($48 million or 32%).

22. The APDRF's contribution to responding to the region's disasters has been relatively modest overall, but significant for the Pacific, where resources and capacity are low. An analysis of major disasters in Asia and the Pacific from the EM-DAT International Disasters Database shows that the APDRF was used for about 2% of the more than 2,000 natural disasters in the region from 2009 to 2024 (Appendix 4).[21] For larger DMCs in Asia, the APDRF grants, even when used to a maximum of $3 million, represent a relatively small amount. However, for Pacific DMCs, grants from APDRF often represent a significant contribution to disaster response efforts by the international community, in addition to support from

[21] Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters. EM-DAT International Disasters Database

ADB's crisis response window to eligible countries.[22] ADB's group A countries received the greatest number of grants (Appendix 5, Figure A5.3).

23. The APDRF is envisaged to provide the most expeditious support. The rationale for establishing the APDRF, as presented in the 2009 fund paper (footnote 2), is essentially to fill a gap to more fully address ADB's DEAP. The establishment paper notes that even with accelerated loan preparation processes it is unlikely that funds under ADB's EAL modality (which are intended to support longer-term reconstruction and rehabilitation) could be available to affected government and communities in less than 12 weeks. Therefore, the APDRF aimed to provide more immediate financial assistance to affected DMCs than could be achieved by EALs.

24. The APDRF was envisaged to bridge the gap between existing and long-term arrangements but lacks supporting guidance. While APDRF grants may help fill a gap, neither the APDRF establishment paper nor the APDRF guidelines provide any actions to actually help bridge the specified gap, and ADB policies and plans do not specify in practical terms how APDRF should contribute. Interviews with ADB staff indicated that repurposing existing operations and contingent disaster financing sometimes enables more rapid emergency financing and allows more significant volumes. However, because it is grant funding APDRF does not impact the future borrowing options of DMCs, which is highly valued. The more recent APDRF second window provides for the use of APDRF grants for PDNAs, and thereby provides a more direct link between the APDRF, EALs, and other reconstruction lending.

25. The APDRF is defined as a special fund to provide grants for restoring lifesaving services in the immediate aftermath of a disaster (footnote 20, para. 1). This implies providing humanitarian assistance. The 2015 and 2017 APDRF reviews refer to the fund as providing humanitarian support. In practice, APDRF support spans the continuum of activities between humanitarian relief and early recovery, which is an area not covered by any other ADB-administered fund; this potentially positions the APDRF as a complementary instrument that can provide immediate response and also generate lessons on how to better prepare for disasters.

26. Strategy 2030, ADB's most recent corporate strategy approved in 2018, strengthened the focus on disaster resilience.[23] The strategy refers to some outputs relevant to DRM including "Finance preparedness for post-disaster response enhanced" and "Planning for climate change adaptation and DRM improved." However, neither really concerns the APDRF. The Asian Development Fund and contingent disaster financing are mentioned, but not the APDRF. An entry point to better connect the APDRF with disaster preparedness lies in the lessons that can emerge when it is deployed.

27. The APDRF is incidental to country program strategies. ADB support for a disaster response event is mentioned in the strategies for two of the five countries included in the virtual missions for the APDRF review: for Vanuatu, the Pacific Approach, 2021–2025 refers to delivering quick-disbursing assistance in the wake of disasters;[24] and for Pakistan, the country partnership strategy, 2015–2019 refers to ADB being responsive to the government's requests for assistance in the event of disasters.[25] Earlier strategies for all five mission countries included strengthening and building DMC capacity in DRM, with an emphasis on disaster mitigation. Recent country strategies continue to highlight support for DRM with more emphasis on mainstreaming disaster risk reduction, disaster risk financing (DMC, market-based and ADB-funded), and strengthening resilience, e.g., social insurance schemes in Indonesia; disaster risk financing

[22] The crisis response window provides ADF grants to eligible countries to cover the costs of relief, early recovery, and reconstruction following disasters and emergencies, including disasters triggered by natural hazards—such as severe cyclones and typhoons, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, droughts, and floods—as well as public health emergencies, including epidemics and pandemics, and large cross-border movements of displaced persons. Eligible Group A countries can receive up to 100% of their annual country allocation or up to $100 million (whichever is lower) from the crisis response window.

[23] ADB. 2018. *Strategy 2030: Achieving a Prosperous, Inclusive, Resilient, and Sustainable Asia and the Pacific.*

[24] ADB. 2021. *Pacific Approach 2021–2025*.

[25] ADB. 2015. *Country Partnership Strategy: Pakistan, 2015–2019.*

in Mongolia; insurance mechanisms to help mitigate the impact of disasters in Pakistan and the Pacific. Sri Lanka's country partnership strategy, 2018–2022 refers to mainstreaming disaster resilience in ADB operations while its country partnership strategy, 2024–2028, identifies climate action and disaster resilience as a crosscutting theme.[26]

28. **Pre-conditions to avail the grant.** Currently under the 2022 guidelines, assistance may only be granted once the following emergency conditions have been met: (i) a disaster triggered by a natural hazard has occurred in a DMC; (ii) an emergency has been officially declared that is of a scale beyond the capacity of the country and its own agencies to meet the immediate expenses necessary to restore lifesaving services to the affected populations; and (iii) the UN humanitarian and/or resident coordinator has confirmed the scale and implications of the disaster and has indicated a general amount of funding that would be required to assist in alleviating the situation. The second condition is interpreted flexibly and broadly. Prior to 2015, guidelines referred to the declaration of a "national emergency," which is not preferred by some governments because of valid strategic considerations, such as concerns for the country's tourism industry or business confidence or when the disaster affects only a region and not the whole country. But this was also interpreted very flexibly, and exemptions were applied. All 20 grants included in the mission countries satisfied the pre-conditions. Grant approval memos address the pre-conditions, and this is checked prior to grant approval. No GCR has raised an issue. Broadly, permitted uses include any activity that is consistent with the provision or restoration of lifesaving services immediately following a declared disaster.

29. Evidence of agreed use from approval memos is generally broad, as these are composed immediately after a disaster, when needs and priorities are likely to be in a state of flux. Many grant approval memos refer to the need to alleviate fiscal constraints faced by the DMC, tacitly recognizing that APDRF funds may be used to fill gaps as they arise. A few approval memos, however, refer to a government request for a type of assistance that is beyond the scope of APDRF, or assistance that could not feasibly be delivered quickly enough to be within the scope. Of the 20 grants reviewed for the five mission countries, four natural disaster response grants included uses that posed a high risk to timely delivery. These examples are further described in the Box.

30. Health emergencies represented a new scope for APDRF support. The COVID-19 pandemic presented a new dynamic for the APDRF, with many DMCs needing assistance to take pre-emptive action, i.e., not to restore services but to adapt and strengthen the capability of existing (mainly health) services as preventative measures. This was most evident in the Pacific, where only Papua New Guinea and Fiji had reported cases of COVID-19 at the time APDRF grants were being approved. For example, Vanuatu had not had a positive case when its grant (Grant 0720) was approved, and the funds were used to help prevent an outbreak, including boosting capacity to quickly quarantine any arriving persons that tested positive. In many other DMCs, assistance was required to prepare for and respond to second and third waves of infection. In early 2020, ADB made a provision for drawing on the APDRF in ADB's response to COVID-19 by providing that a health emergency such as a pandemic would be considered a "natural disaster" for the purposes of the eligibility criteria (Operations Manual D7/BP paragraph 4).[27] The 2022 implementing guidelines (footnote 19) also replaced "natural disasters" with "natural hazards, including disease outbreaks" as main triggers of the APDRF support.

[26] ADB. 2017. *Country Partnership Strategy: Sri Lanka, 2018–2022*; and ADB. 2024. *Country Partnership Strategy: Sri Lanka, 2024–2028*.
[27] ADB. 2023. Disaster and Emergency Assistance. *Operations Manual.* OM D7.

Grant Assistance that Risks Deviating from Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund Objectives

The largest component (40%) of grant funds for the Sri Lanka Flood and Landslide Disaster Response grant (Grant 0481)[a] was applied to a series of district-level rehabilitation and livelihood development subprojects in which the purpose and timeframe were unsuited for the Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund. For the most part, the works were undertaken after the emergency response period. In addition, the grant period had to be extended to complete all activities, and a relatively high level of oversight was required, which the Sri Lanka Resident Mission provided. The largest allocation for the Second Sri Lanka Flood and Landslide Disaster Response (Grant 0533)[b] was for transitional shelter, which was an early priority, because many people were displaced. However, the size and permanent nature of the construction of these shelters precluded their immediate availability as a lifesaving service.

For the West Sumatera Earthquake Disaster grant in Indonesia (Grant 0168)[c] the government requested, and the Asian Development Bank accepted, the use of grant funds for procurement, including of rescue vehicles and communication equipment. The grant agreement was signed some 3 weeks after the earthquake and amended 3 weeks later. At this point, the search and rescue phase had passed, and the proposed procurement could only have been of benefit for future disasters.

The two Dzud Disaster Response grants (Grant 0200 and Grant 0475) to Mongolia[d] also provided emergency vehicles and special vehicles equipped with disinfection facilities for sterilization and disinfection of dead animal carcasses to prevent spread of human and animal contagious diseases. The time taken for the procurement processing of such vehicles precluded their immediate use for restoring lifesaving services.

[a] ADB. Sri Lanka : Sri Lanka Flood and Landslide Disaster Response
[b] ADB: Sri Lanka: Second Sri Lanka Flood and Landslide Disaster Response Project
[c] ADB. Indonesia: West Sumatera Earthquake Disaster Project
[d] ADB. Mongolia: Dzud Disaster Response Project and ADB. Mongolia: Dzud Disaster Response.
Source: Asian Development Bank (Independent Evaluation Department).

31. The timing of grant disbursement varied, with some grants disbursed during early recovery. There is an overlap between the emergency response (humanitarian assistance) and early recovery (more developmental) phases of disaster response. Many APDRF grants are disbursed when early recovery is underway, some APDRF funds are spent on early recovery activities, as evidenced by some grants examined in the five APDRF review missions. Technically, this is out of scope. The 2015 revised guidelines provided for retroactive financing of disaster relief costs up to a maximum of 30% of total grant proceeds, but in the absence of monitoring, it is difficult to confirm whether the retroactively used funds were indeed used exclusively for relief. The 2017 APDRF review is sanguine about this crossover, noting that "APDRF grants were used to support activities straddling humanitarian relief and early recovery purposes. A crossover between humanitarian relief and early recovery operations is inevitable, and some activities can serve both purposes, such as cash-for-work programs and certain infrastructure repairs (footnote 4, para. 37)."

32. **Overall, the APDRF is assessed *relevant*.** At the fund level, the APDRF remains a relevant instrument in ADB's suite of responses to support DMCs in addressing gaps in DRM and response. There are, however, some differences in focus between ADB's overall policy and the activities supported under the APDRF. In particular, the ADB DEAP (2021) has a broad focus on disaster risk reduction, disaster risk management as part of development, resilience, and resilient recovery (including effective relief), while APDRF focuses on disaster response. The APDRF was intended to bridge the gap between ADB's disaster risk reduction loans and grants, and enable more long-term post-disaster reconstruction lending. However, the practical mechanisms for bridging this gap were minimal until the second window was established to better link APDRF grants with EALs and loans focusing on recovery. At the grant level, most of the assessed projects were well aligned with identified needs, well targeted, and in line with APDRF objectives. Needs, gaps, and/or priorities may change after disbursement and APDRF grants have the flexibility to allow DMCs to change how grant funds are applied without consulting ADB, reflecting needs on the ground as the emergency evolves, provided the changed use of the funds remains consistent with

the (typically very broad) project description in Schedule 1 to the grant agreement. For a small number of the grants studied, relevance has been compromised by substantial delays, and/or by changes made by the DMC. COVID-19 demonstrated the effective use of APDRF grants to complement ADB's wider pandemic support, but the inclusion of such health emergencies has not been fully incorporated into the APDRF guidelines.

B. Effectiveness

33. **Evaluating grant effectiveness in the APDRF is challenging.** There is no design and monitoring framework and no supporting indicators or targets to consider for either the fund or for individual grants. ADB has not sought to make an in-depth determination of how effectively grant funds are used. No implementation or beneficiary reporting are required. Among the mission country grants that were reviewed, monitoring and supervision were observed for only one grant. Audit reports detail what funds were spent on, but the quality of the reports varies, and a substantial number of audit reports are deemed exceptional. GCRs, where available, often rate effectiveness but these are not independently evaluated.

34. For this evaluation, it is only possible to determine effectiveness for mission countries. Grant funds were evaluated "likely to have been effective" or "unlikely to have been effective" by determining if the grant funds were:

(i) spent within 6 months of signing of the grant agreement; and
(ii) deployed for (or applied to) restoring lifesaving services consistent with fund guidance and benefiting those affected by the disaster (or emergency).

35. The first test reflects the standard provision in grant agreements and the fact that it is unlikely that grant funds spent long after a disaster event will be lifesaving. Grants that are quickly disbursed and expended are generally far more likely to be effective in meeting the objectives of the APDRF. Evidence for this test is generally readily available, but the mission country grants illustrate that efficiency is not always a reliable indicator of effectiveness. In addition, under some circumstances, needs are chronic or emerge over a long period, in which case spending funds within 6 months of agreement signing is not necessarily critical to effectiveness. An example of the chronic circumstance is meeting the ongoing lifesaving needs of people displaced for a long period by a volcanic eruption in Vanuatu (Grant 0608). The health emergency (COVID-19) grants are also examples, where new waves of infection heightened an existing emergency.

36. The second test, determining if funded activities were within scope, is more difficult to ascertain, as there is little documentation. The evaluation attempted to capture the extent to which the use of APDRF grants aligns with the fund's purpose through interviews during the country missions.

37. Ten of the 13 mission country natural disaster response grants were spent within 6 months (Table 1). Funds for Vanuatu's Manaro volcanic eruption (Grant 0551) and Cyclone Harold (Grant 0695) were used for restoring a lifesaving service (within scope) and well within 6 months (within time). For Grant 0551, contracts for food rations and chartering evacuation vessels were signed within 2 months of the eruption. Funds for the grant in Sri Lanka for floods and landslides (Grant 0247) were within scope and also within time, although spending extended right up to the 6-month grant closing date. For the Second Manaro Volcanic Eruption Response grant in Vanuatu (Grant 0608), the procurement of food aid for evacuees on Santo was delayed beyond the 6-month cut-off but the need was ongoing and the APDRF grant effectively augmented ongoing assistance provided from several sources. The ongoing care of displaced people presents a chronic need. Funds from Mongolia's Dzud Disaster Response grant (Grant 0475) were used to make cash payments to herders, which were distributed within a few days of the 6-month grant closing date of 11 April 2016, and to reimburse various government expenses incurred from December 2015 to October 2016 (75% of grant funds).

Table 1: Natural Disaster Responses Effectiveness

DMC	Grant No.	Approval Year	Grant Name	Approved Amount	Spent Within 6 Months
INO	0168	2009	West Sumatera Earthquake Disaster	$3,000,000	Yes
INO	0619	2018	Sulawesi Tsunami Emergency Response	$3,000,000	Unclear
MON	0200	2010	Dzud Disaster Response	$2,500,000	Yes
MON	0475	2016	Dzud Disaster Response Project	$2,000,000	Yes
PAK	0214	2010	National Flood Emergency Response	$3,000,000	Yes
PAK	0266	2011	Sindh and Baluchistan Flood Disaster Response	$3,000,000	Yes
SRI	0247	2011	Flood Disaster Response	$3,000,000	Yes
SRI	0481	2016	Sri Lanka Flood and Landslide Disaster Response	$2,000,000	No
SRI	0533	2017	Second Sri Lanka Flood and Landslide Disaster Response	$2,000,000	No
VAN	0428	2015	Vanuatu Cyclone Pam Disaster Response Project	$1,000,000	Yes
VAN	0695	2020	Tropical Cyclone Harold Emergency Response Project	$1,000,000	Yes
VAN	0551	2017	Manaro Volcano Disaster Response Project	$200,000	Yes
VAN	0608	2018	Second Manaro Volcano Disaster Response Project	$500,000	Yes

DMC = developing member country, INO = Indonesia, MON = Mongolia, PAK = Pakistan, SRI = Sri Lanka, VAN = Vanuatu.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

38. There were examples where the use of grants shifted from restoring lifesaving service through the APDRF toward early recovery activities. The two grants to Sri Lanka for the Flood and Disaster Response Project (Grants 0481 and 0533) both had to be extended beyond 6 months, and the "transitional shelters" constructed were not available when needed to those who had been affected by the floods. They were, however, of future benefit. For the National Flood Emergency Response grant to Pakistan (Grant 0214), a 2-month delay in signing the grant agreement pushed the 6-month cut-off out a further 2 months. The intention had been to provide displaced people with tents and blankets to protect them from the approaching winter, but procurement did not commence until January, and a substantial proportion of the tents and blankets remained in store but were drawn on for a subsequent flood.

39. Health emergencies present a very different dynamic for timeliness. This evaluation considers all six health emergency (COVID-19) grants included in the five mission countries to have been within scope and *likely effective* notwithstanding that three had to be extended beyond 6-months given the nature of the emergency (Table 2).

Table 2: COVID-19 Emergency Responses Effectiveness

DMC	Grant No.	Approval Year	Grant Name	Approved Amount	Spent Within 6 Months
INO	0686	2020	COVID-19 Emergency Response	$3,000,000	No
MON	0688	2020	COVID-19 Emergency Response	$1,000,000	Yes
MON	0734	2020	COVID-19 Emergency Response - Phase 2	$1,500,000	Yes
PAK	0694	2020	COVID-19 Emergency Response	$2,000,000	No
SRI	0702	2020	COVID-19 Emergency Response	$3,000,000	No
VAN	0720	2020	COVID-19 Emergency Response	$1,500,000	Yes

COVID-19 = coronavirus disease, DMC = developing member country, INO = Indonesia, MON = Mongolia, PAK = Pakistan, SRI = Sri Lanka, VAN = Vanuatu.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

40. The processing of the COVID-19 Emergency Response grant (Grant 0694) to Pakistan was particularly slow, with 7 months elapsing from grant approval to signing, with an extension necessitated by procurement problems. However, the COVID-19 emergency was ongoing at the time, and the funds were used for restoring lifesaving services, with an increased threat and need for testing by the time supplies were procured by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). The Ministry of Health confirmed during an interview that 20 laboratories benefitted from the supplies, which substantially increased testing capacity at a critical juncture in the pandemic. The situation with the COVID-19 emergency

response (Grant 0734) to Mongolia was similar: 12 sets of laboratory equipment were similarly delayed into 2021 but were nevertheless belatedly effective.[28] The grant to Vanuatu (Grant 0720) demonstrates that timely effective action in health emergencies can be pre-emptive when deployed prior to a disaster. Vanuatu had not had a positive case when the grant was approved to help prevent an outbreak.

41. The APDRF has sometimes provided an entry point for future ADB support. The APDRF grants have been succeeded by additional ADB assistance for post-disaster recovery and reconstruction efforts on 11 occasions. There is some evidence that the use of APDRF for COVID-19 has also resulted in follow-up work in the health sector. For example, in Indonesia, the APDRF grant resulted in greater interaction with health officials and resulted in the $1.5 million regional technical assistance grant (TA 9950) follow-on project, which recruited consultants to support the Ministry of Health in forming a strategic quick-response technical team for COVID-19 policies and strategies.[29] The regional technical assistance, in turn, was influential in ADB's commitment of $1 billion in lending for Indonesia's health sector.

42. **Overall, the APDRF by design, has been *effective* in delivering and financing grants intended to restore lifesaving services**. Although closing reports are expected to report on grant effectiveness, there is insufficient evidence to determine whether those grants have actually restored lifesaving services because APDRF grants lack results frameworks, ADB undertakes no systematic monitoring of results, and APDRF grants contribute to a wider international effort to respond to disasters. In most cases, however, the use of the grant proceeds aligns with the APDRF's purpose. Where there have been deviations from immediate restoration of lifesaving services, the grant proceeds are still likely to contribute to early recovery and increased resilience to future emergencies.

C. Efficiency

43. The APDRF guidelines do not capture the breath of disasters that can impact efficiency. The APDRF was designed for sudden-onset natural disasters, that is, disasters triggered by natural hazards occurring with little or no warning. The fund paper and guidelines do not explicitly address other types of disasters and emergencies, including (i) slower onset natural disasters such as droughts generally and dzud in Mongolia specifically; (ii) chronic disasters or those that generate chronic needs, e.g., displaced populations requiring ongoing care and maintenance, as was the case following the Merapi volcanic disaster in Indonesia; and (iii) health emergencies, which can present a long, uneven crisis with varying emergency needs at different points in time, such as waves of infection during a pandemic. The guidelines also contain no reference to the transition from emergency response to recovery, while the governance structure does not provide a role for financing partners. In summary, the fund paper and the implementing guidelines are outdated.

44. The expected timeliness of grants is not quantified. The 2009 fund establishment paper and the guidelines stress immediacy and quick disbursement but there is a lack of guidance about what this means in practice and in context. Although suggested turnaround times are set for some grant processing steps, there are no indicative targets for request to approval, and approval to disbursement, and no guidance to suggest what to do in the case of substantial delays, if for example, emergency needs shift into early recovery. The reference in the fund paper and guidelines to restore "lifesaving" (sometimes "life-preserving") services is somewhat problematic because it presupposes that APDRF grants can be processed, disbursed, and utilized rapidly enough to address the acute needs that typically present in the first weeks following a sudden onset disaster. At best, APDRF grants are more likely to be available to augment the lifesaving interventions already commenced by first responders and more fast-reacting agencies and organizations. The more likely scenario, given real world processing and disbursement

[28] Based on the progress report, delays were caused by (i) limited numbers of suppliers for COVID-19-related products n the context of high global demand; (ii) a reduced number of flights during the pandemic, leading to delays in booking cargo, and; (iii) a delay in clearance of the last shipment caused by the government's internal processing of the exemption.

[29] ADB. Regional: Regional Support to Address the Outbreak of Coronavirus Disease 2019 and Potential Outbreaks of Other Communicable Diseases.

experience, is that the APDRF grant funds will be used in the (overlapping) early recovery phase. But these issues are not addressed by either the fund paper or the guidelines.

45. Suggested business process timeline is laid out but there is no target. The expected actions and milestones based on the current guidelines are in Appendix 2, Figure A2. The most important milestone for evaluation purposes is grant disbursement, given that providing quick-disbursing grants is key to responding to a DMC's "urgent need for resources immediately after a disaster has occurred" (footnote 2, para. 9). While turnaround times are suggested for some grant processing steps leading up to disbursement, there is no overall target, and some actions are beyond ADB's control. A DMC first has to declare a disaster or emergency. Normally, the request is made quite quickly in the case of sudden-onset disasters, but there have been exceptions, and slow-onset disasters may build for some time before a request is made. Prior to presenting the approval memo, the resident mission relies on the UN humanitarian and/or resident coordinator to provide a letter confirming the scale and implications of the disaster, and indicating a general amount of funding that would be required to assist in alleviating the situation. Timing is also dependent on when the DMC signs the grant agreement following grant approval, and when the DMC presents the withdrawal letter that triggers disbursement.

46. For assessment purposes the processing actions involved have been grouped into three intermediate steps: from (i) request to approval, (ii) approval to agreement signing, and (iii) agreement to grant disbursement. In practice, the time taken for each step appears broadly similar when the data are presented as averages and medians over time across the 87 grants for which the required timing data is available:[30]

(i) request to approval averages 19.7 days, with a median of 13.0 days;
(ii) approval to agreement averages 21.2 days, with a median of 8.5 days;
(iii) agreement to disbursement averages 24.7 days, with a median of 11.0 days; and
(iv) overall, from request to disbursement averages 65.5 days, with a median of 43 days.

47. However, as outlined in Appendix 5, it is apparent that the time taken for each step can vary considerably between regions and by type of disaster.

48. Processing and disbursement efficiency varies across countries. The variability in processing and disbursement efficiency is illustrated by the large variations across grants in mission countries. For natural disaster response grants, time required from (i) request to approval varies from (a) 1 day for the West Sumatera earthquake grant to Indonesia (Grant 0168) and floods grant to Pakistan (Grant 0214), to (b) 33 days for the Manaro volcanic eruption grant to Vanuatu (Grant 0551); (ii) approval to agreement varies from (a) 1–2 days for the grant to Mongolia for dzud (Grant 0200) and Sri Lanka floods (Grants 0247 and 0533), to (b) 81 days for Indonesia's Sulawesi tsunami (Grant 0619); and (iii) agreement to disbursement varies from (a) 1 day for grants to Mongolia for dzud (Grant 0200), grants to Vanuatu for tropical cyclone (Grant 0428) and Tropical Cyclone Harold (Grant 0695), and floods in Sri Lanka (Grant 0481); to (b) 63 days for Indonesia's West Sumatera earthquake (Grant 0168). Health emergency (COVID-19) response grants have typically taken far longer to process: (i) request to approval varies from (a) 11 days in Sri Lanka grant (Grant 0702) to (b) 44 days in Vanuatu (Grant 0720);[31] (ii) approval to grant signing varies from (a) 1 day for the COVID-19 grant in Mongolia (Grant 0688) to (b) a maximum of 7 months for the grant in Pakistan (Grant 0694); and (iii) agreement to disbursement varies from a minimum of (a) 1 day for Pakistan grant (Grant 0694) and (b) a maximum of 83 days for the grant in Mongolia (Grant 0734).

[30] Of 87 grants and 3 direct charges in the portfolio 2009–2024, 11 have no request date and 2 have no disbursement date, leaving 71 grants.
[31] According to ADB's Human and Social Development Sector Office (SD3-HSD), this was delayed because of the need to comply with the requirements of eight other DMCs.

49. Disbursement varies across countries. It is evident from the mission countries that each step—from request to approval, approval to agreement, and agreement to disbursement—can be completed in just 1 day, and that grants can be disbursed within 8 days of receipt of the government's request. But in practice, substantial delays have frequently been encountered at one or more of these steps. The guidelines provide that, where possible, funds will be disbursed within 24 hours upon receipt by ADB of the grant agreement and the withdrawal application, both duly signed by the DMC. Three of the mission country grants were disbursed within 1 day—for the dzud in Mongolia (Grant 0200), tropical cyclone in Vanuatu (Grant 0428), and floods in Sri Lanka (Grant 0481).

50. The leading reasons for delays are difficult to identify, but some key lessons do emerge. On ADB's side, evidence suggests that ADB's efficiency can improve when a project officer has previous experience processing an APDRF grant. For natural disaster response grants, the capacity of the implementing agency has been a factor. For health emergency (COVID-19) grants, evidence indicates that previous working relationship with the Ministry of Health was a factor. It must be recognized that in the early stages of a large disaster or emergency, many development partners may be offering assistance, which can be very difficult for recipient governments to manage. Development partners seek to reduce this burden through coordination, but much overlapping assistance is usually offered, e.g., personal protective equipment and other basic medical supplies in the early weeks of the COVID-19 health emergency. Mission country interviews have generally indicated that in-kind assistance is more straightforward than receiving funds to procure relief items, equipment, and services, suggesting that anything involving government procurement takes longer to consider. Over time, needs and priorities change as the overall composition of external assistance becomes clearer to the government, which may result in further discussions with ADB's resident mission about how funds will be used.

51. Portfolio efficiency is assessed on the basis of processing and disbursement. A rating scheme for the portfolio as a whole was developed, with processing and disbursement targets. The starting point in establishing the targets is the rationale for establishing the APDRF. The 2009 fund paper presents the EAL modality and observes that although the EAL includes a quick-disbursing component, "even with accelerated loan preparation processes, it is unlikely that the funds could be available to the affected government and communities in less than 12 weeks. Therefore, as part of the implementation of ADB's Disaster and Emergency Assistance Policy, the APDRF should be established to provide immediate financial assistance to affected DMCs" (footnote 2, para. 7). The APDRF was evidently established to fill a gap in ADB's ability to respond more immediately, and specifically earlier than 12 weeks (presumably from a DMC request). With this in mind, 12 weeks has been set as the outer limit, i.e., more than 12 weeks is rated inefficient.

52. From the perspective of restoring lifesaving services, the target should be to disburse funds in 2 weeks or less (highly efficient). The business process described in the APDRF guidelines suggests this is possible, and in practice, nearly one quarter of grants have been processed in 2 weeks or less. It is recognized, however, that ADB is not the only responder and very unlikely to be the first responder, and that the APDRF is expected to augment what some humanitarian actors can do much more rapidly than a multilateral development bank. Grants were deemed efficient if they were disbursed in 7 weeks or less from the date of the request.

53. A full set of timing data was available for 80 out of the 87 grants. Of these, 53% were processed and disbursed efficiently or highly efficiently (in 7 weeks or less), while 47% were processed less than efficiently or inefficiently (in over 7 weeks). Some 26% of grants are rated inefficient (took more than 12 weeks to process and disburse). A number of grants are rated highly efficient (18%), demonstrating the feasibility of providing immediate financing, but underscoring the need to anticipate and mitigate factors causing delays in grant processing and disbursement.

54. **Efficiency over time has been erratic.** There is no indication that processing and disbursement efficiency has improved over time, with considerable variation in efficiency ratings. (Figure 4).

Figure 4: APDRF Grant Processing and Disbursement Efficiency, 2009–2024
(n=80)



APDRF = Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund, n = number.
Note: Highly Efficient = 2 weeks or less from request to disbursement; Efficient = > 2 weeks to 7 weeks; Less than Efficient = > 7 weeks to 12 weeks; Inefficient = > 12 weeks.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

55. Natural disaster grants were found to be processed more efficiently than health emergency grants. About three-fourths of the grants processed and disbursed efficiently or highly efficiently were natural disaster grants (32 out of 42), while the majority of grants rated inefficient were health emergency grants (26 of 37). For the 44 natural disaster grants with a full set of timing data, 73% have been processed and disbursed efficiently or highly efficiently (in under 7 weeks). For the 37 health emergency grants with a full set of timing data, only 27% (10 grants) are rated efficient (there were no health emergency grants that were rated highly efficient), while 43% are rated inefficient (16/37). It should be noted that APDRF grants for natural hazard disaster events are processed after the event has passed, while health emergencies (COVID-19 grants in the context of APDRF) were processed at the onset of the pandemic, while it was still evolving, and with several restrictions still in place. Nevertheless, there are some natural disaster events, like extreme weather events that have longer-term effects, which prevent critical activities, including processing of grant support.

56. Grant extensions often result in delays and inefficiencies. The APDRF grants have a standard implementation period of 6 months. More than a fourth of the grants (26%) have been extended, and some have been extended more than once. DMCs' requests for extensions beyond 6 months but it appears that most extensions were agreed to allow more time for the DMC to fully implement activities and/or procure goods or equipment, and in so doing fully expend or account for grant funds. In some cases, the extension period allowed time for the DMC to identify and present validation of prior expenditure. Allocating and spending grant funds is the responsibility of the DMC, but ADB project officers are required by the guidelines to engage with implementing agencies to monitor progress and provide guidance on ADB policies and procedures. Nevertheless, the evaluation finds that the longer the extension, the higher the risk that the funds will no longer be used for lifesaving services as the emergency moves to the recovery phase. The application of the retroactive financing is also not an assurance, because there is no monitoring of actual funds use.

57. Monitoring and supervision are insufficient to effectively implement grants. It is difficult to assess the efficiency of implementation and the adequacy of monitoring and supervision because there are no requirements for implementation reporting. Indeed, there is no formal requirement (e.g., midterm review type of mission) to review progress, address any bottlenecks, support the DMC in reconciling expenses, or systematically capture lessons. However, one indication of inadequate monitoring and supervision is the high proportion of grants (about 30%) with approved extensions to allow full implementation of activities and/or procurement of goods and equipment, and thus full spending or accounting for grant funds. The APDRF 2022 guidelines provide that the ADB disaster coordinators should "meet implementing and executing agencies periodically (preferably monthly) to monitor progress in grant administration, implementation, liquidation, and auditing and to provide guidance on ADB policies and

procedures as relevant to the APDRF" (footnote 19, para. 40). A formal requirement to document these meetings would greatly contribute to learning.

58. APDRF governance needs to be strengthened to improve transparency and enhance opportunities for learning. GCRs have not been published, and it is unclear whether they are circulated to the Board. Based on interviews with representatives, GCRs are not circulated to the UN humanitarian and/or resident coordinator, which should be a minimum requirement, given their role in securing grant approval, and for the opportunity to foster learning. There are no published annual reports and only one internal annual report (covering 18 May–31 August 2021, and issued because the Government of Japan provided $75 million in 2020). In the absence of public GCRs and annual reports, there is no learning loop to inform future grants.

59. **Overall, the APDRF is rated *less than efficient*.** The key finding was that 26% of grants took more than 12 weeks to process and disburse. This is longer than would be expected for an EAL, the main benchmark for assessing efficiency of APDRF. On the positive side, 53% took 7 weeks or less to process and disburse. Monitoring and reporting are minimal and not formally required, and GCRs are not published, which greatly limits the opportunities for course correction and learning.

D. Sustainability

60. **The financing of the fund is *likely sustainable.*** From a financial standpoint, the fund can be sustained, either through additional financing from ADB's net income, or through contributions from development partners. In practice, for most of the fund's life it has been replenished from net income. The one exception is a $75 million contribution by the Government of Japan in response to COVID-19; these funds were timely and supported ADB's wider efforts to support its DMCs in tackling COVID-19. However, the prospects for further contributions from development partners are low. Fund injections will be needed for specific disasters in the future. ADB's recent additional net income financing of APDRF demonstrates a commitment by development partners, through Board members, to support the fund. This stands in stark contrast to other special funds, such as the Climate Change Fund and the Regional Cooperation and Integration Fund, which are no longer supported by net income and are being wound down. From this perspective, the APDRF, as a fund, is considered *likely sustainable.*

61. The sustainability of individual grants was not assessed, because individual grants are for immediate restoration of lifesaving services, and not intended to be sustainable. Operationally, despite delays in some cases, ADB has been able to respond to emergency requests, indicating that the institutional setup for APDRF is generally sufficient, from the onset through processing and disbursement of funds. Subsequently, however, there is a gap in terms of addressing any bottlenecks, supporting DMCs, or capturing lessons because monitoring and reporting are not required, and the governance structure is not set up for this purpose.

E. Overall Assessment

62. Based on the foregoing, the evaluation found that the APDRF was relevant, effective, less than efficient, and likely sustainable. Overall, this evaluation finds the APDRF *successful*.

CHAPTER 4

Conclusions, Issues, Lessons, and Recommendations

63. This section provides summary conclusions and key issues that if addressed could enhance future deployment of APDRF grants following natural disaster events, as well as lessons and recommendations.

A. Conclusions

64. The APDRF has proven to be a relevant and valued mechanism for immediate disaster response among DMCs, particularly because of its grant-based nature and generally swift support for lifesaving services. However, its integration within ADB's broader DRM strategy remains limited, particularly in terms of operational coordination with other instruments such as EALs and contingent disaster financing. For example, closer alignment between APDRF grants and EALs should be considered when relevant. The establishment of a second window in 2021 improved the linkage with recovery financing, but further clarity and strategic alignment are needed to fully leverage the role of APDRF grants within ADB's evolving DRM approach. Indonesia provides a positive example: ADB provided an APDRF grant (Grant 0619) to support immediate relief efforts in Central Sulawesi following a tsunami, followed by a quick disbursing budget support EAL (Loan 3741)[32] in 2018, and supplemented by a second EAL (Loan 3792 and 3793)[33] for post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction aid in 2019. This was followed in 2020 with a contingent disaster financing program to support Indonesia's DRM reforms.[34] This example aligns with IED's broader topical paper on ADB's crisis response, which promotes a proactive build-back-better approach along a continuum from crisis response to long-term development.[35]

65. At the project level, most APDRF grants were effectively aligned with urgent post-disaster needs and allowed flexibility to respond to change. However, a small number of grants ventured into higher-risk, longer-term recovery activities, challenging the fund's mandate of immediate relief. Furthermore, the APDRF lacks design and monitoring frameworks at the fund or grant level, which complicates efforts to systematically assess effectiveness or draw lessons for future implementation. While disbursement speed met expectations in many cases, considerable delays in others—sometimes even lagging behind other ADB financing tools—highlight the need for clearer timelines and operational standards.

66. The evaluation indicates that while ADB has the institutional capacity to manage the APDRF, its governance and oversight mechanisms need strengthening to improve transparency and foster institutional learning. The absence of structured monitoring and publicly accessible GCRs limits the ability to evaluate performance, identify systemic bottlenecks, and foster learning. With limited prospects for external contributions, continued reliance on ADB's internal funding underscores the importance of enhancing efficiency and accountability to sustain stakeholder confidence. Although APDRF grants are not inherently sustainable because of their short-term focus, their continued relevance depends on better integration, clearer guidance, and stronger oversight.

[32] ADB. Indonesia: Emergency Assistance for Recovery and Rehabilitation from Recent Disasters
[33] ADB. Indonesia: Emergency Assistance for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
[34] ADB. Indonesia: Disaster Resilience Improvement Program
[35] Independent Evaluation Department. 2024. Topical Paper: ADB Support for the Transition from Crisis Response to Long-Term Development in Asia and the Pacific. ADB.

67. Overall, APDRF was assessed *successful*. The evaluation found that the fund is *relevant* but could be better integrated into ADB's evolving approach to DRM. APDRF was assessed *effective* in delivering and financing grants intended to restore lifesaving services. APDRF was assessed *less than efficient* because of delays, monitoring, and governance inefficiencies. APDRF, as a fund, is considered *likely sustainable* as long it continues to secure support from ADB's net income.

B. Issues

68. **Delays often cause APDRF grants to be disbursed during early recovery, highlighting the need for better anticipatory coordination to enhance flexibility, effectiveness, and alignment with ADB's broader resilience-building goals.** There are differences in focus between the APDRF and ADB's overall DRM approach. ADB's DEAP (2021) focuses on (i) disaster risk reduction, (ii) disaster risk management as part of development, (iii) enhancement of resilience, and (iv) resilient recovery (including effective relief). In contrast, the APDRF focuses on disaster response. In practice, APDRF support spans the continuum of activities between humanitarian relief and early recovery. APDRF grants are often (unintentionally) disbursed in the early recovery phase. The 2017 APDRF performance review described three overlapping phases of post-disaster response and reported that APDRF grants had sometimes been used to support activities straddling the first and second phases—humanitarian relief and early recovery—noting that some crossover is inevitable (para. 31).[36] Given the finding in Chapter 3 that 53% of natural disaster response grants were disbursed more than 7 weeks after a government request for assistance, including 26% in which disbursement occurred after more than 12 weeks, it is likely that the APDRF natural disaster response grants are often disbursed when early recovery is underway. Maintaining the quick-disbursing imperative while making grants available for emergency relief and/or early recovery activities, and allowing retroactive financing, should be welcomed by DMCs because it increases flexibility. Early recovery activities may require additional oversight, possibly including technical assistance, but such a shift presents an important opportunity. Sound investments in early recovery contribute to longer-term preventative action (and thus resilience). Strategically, this potentially provides a bridge to longer-term ADB programming, including EALs.

69. A fundamental problem contributing to delays is that DMCs often take time to determine how to use and manage APDRF grants rather than having an agreed framework in place and a better advance understanding to make this more predictable. Resident missions need to invest more in anticipatory planning and action, in coordination with DMCs and UN resident coordinators (who oversee disaster management in collaboration with individual DMCs). Better planning for the use of APDRF and taking action to mitigate prior or potential causes of delay would improve grant relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency.

70. **The lack of guidance on monitoring the APDRF and its performance targets presents implementation, evaluation, and learning limitations.** The fund's establishment paper and series of guidelines all lack clear indicative delivery standards for the APDRF, and fail to provide guidance on actions to take in the case of substantial delays. The lack of indicative targets makes grant evaluation challenging. Monitoring and reporting systems need to be strengthened to improve APDRF grant design, implementation, and evaluation, and to enhance learning from APDRF grants.

71. APDRF grants were designed to meet immediate, short-term DMC liquidity needs. Immediate liquidity has value and is relevant, at least in principle. A critical assumption is that grants will be processed and disbursed rapidly enough to be used by DMCs to support restoration of lifesaving services. But quick disbursement has not been the norm, with 26% of grants disbursed more than 12 weeks after a DMC requested assistance (Chapter 3); this is only partially mitigated by the provision for up to 30%

[36] Post-disaster response is divided into three overlapping phases: (i) humanitarian assistance, involving aid to the affected population to meet their basic needs (food, water, medical services, temporary shelter, and search and rescue); (ii) early recovery, involving the restoration of essential services and temporary repairs to support the reestablishment of economic and social activities; and (iii) reconstruction, involving the comprehensive, full restoration of infrastructure.

retroactive financing. In some instances, repurposing of existing operations and contingent disaster financing provide a more rapid response than the APDRF. The timing standards for APDRF intervention are unclear. Following a sudden-onset natural disaster, saving lives involves search and rescue followed by the provision of relief and protection. Timelines vary, however: search and rescue timing is measured in days; while relief and protection may have a duration of weeks and or even months. For sudden-onset disasters, support from APDRF would not be expected to extend beyond 12 weeks, but if the needs become chronic (e.g., because the population remains displaced following the disaster) relief and protection needs will persist. In some situations, needs escalate over time, as happened with the second and third waves of COVID-19 infection. These issues of timing are not addressed in the APDRF guidelines.

72. There is also a monitoring, reporting, and learning gap. Currently, there is no formal requirement for grant implementation monitoring. The 2022 implementation guidelines recommends that ADB staff "meet implementing and executing agencies periodically (preferably monthly) to monitor progress in grant administration, implementation, liquidation, and auditing and to provide guidance on ADB policies and procedures as relevant to the APDRF" (footnote 19, para. 40). However, this evaluation found limited documentary evidence of such progress monitoring, which limits ADB's ability to undertake correction and learning during instances of poor implementation and/or inappropriate use of funds, or to identify how to improve preparedness. It would be prudent to formalize post-disbursement reviews as a requirement and as distinct from later lesson exercises. Reporting requirements could be kept to a minimum, with reporting led by the resident mission, and undertaken in coordination with other partners to reduce the administrative burden. By the time of GCR preparation, it is too late to capture implementation issues and lessons. The APDRF 2022 implementation guidelines require GCRs to be disclosed on ADB's website but this has not occurred to date. This further limits the opportunity for learning, as the GCR template includes the requirement to identify "lessons learned that can help improve delivery and implementation of the APDRF grants" (footnote 19, Appendix 10). Good practices to draw from include the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery's Evaluation Policy and Learning Lessons Exercise Tool.[37]

C. Lessons

73. **Cash can be a viable option when adequate government systems are in place**. Even when ADB has disbursed grants quickly, implementation often extended beyond the emergency phase because of procurement delays. Conditional or unconditional cash transfers can overcome this and are now seen as a viable option in disaster response. However, this is not supported by all DMCs because it requires either that registration and payment systems are in place, or that existing systems are adapted in the short term. Although cash has been used under APDRF grants, relevant lessons have not been captured because of weak reporting requirements.

74. **Working with humanitarian partners adds value to APDRF grants.** The APDRF is designed to supplement aid provided by other development partners and agencies. Both ADB's Strategy 2020 (in effect when the fund was established) as well as ADB's current Strategy 2030 target disaster response and assistance in partnership with specialized aid agencies. But disaster response partnerships with the APDRF are not common, although there has been some complementarity. The review of APDRF grants indicates both practical benefits and reservations associated with partnering with specialized agencies, often relating to their mandate, expertise, and experience. The APDRF grant in response to typhoon Odette in the Philippines, which involved collaboration with the World Food Programme (WFP), provides a good example. The partnerships benefited greatly from WFP's physical presence and their monitoring systems, which included a survey of supported households and sex disaggregated data. Consultations with the WFP confirmed that interviews with 380 beneficiaries' households indicated that the households

[37] World Bank Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery.

could meet their food and nutrition needs, which they attributed to the assistance they received.[38] This collaboration has fostered a partnership between ADB and the WFP on food stamps in the Philippines.

D. Recommendations

75. The evaluation offers the following recommendations for ADB:

76. **Recommendation 1: Consider opportunities to discuss future deployment of the APDRF with relevant developing member countries during country dialogues as part of ADB's wider package of disaster support.** At the country and regional levels, ADB should engage with DMCs likely to request assistance, ideally during country partnership strategy preparation, to learn from previous disasters; determine if grant processing, disbursement, and implementation are likely to proceed smoothly; and to identify anticipatory actions and risk mitigation. These discussions should take place where relevant and within the context of ADB's wider package of disaster support, and should be conducted in collaboration with key agencies and partners to align with existing country and possibly regional (e.g., Pacific Islands) DRM frameworks. The capacity of staff in resident missions could be enhanced to address this pre-emptive planning with DMCs and better understand APDRF grant use, deployment, implementation, and monitoring.

77. **Recommendation 2: Update the APDRF guidelines to improve performance standards, grant monitoring, reporting, and learning within ADB's purview**. ADB should develop appropriate standards for grant processing and disbursement to incentivize improved efficiency within ADB's scope of influence. Metrics for measuring the effectiveness of grants that capture the APDRF's unique characteristics and reflect the full range of disasters addressed by the fund should be considered. The funds monitoring, reporting, and learning systems should be strengthened, drawing on international best practices. At the grant level, at least one documented progress review led by the resident mission should be planned, following grant disbursement, to support DMCs in making corrections, addressing implementation issues, and capturing lessons that may be included in the GCRs. ADB should follow its implementation guidelines for the APDRF and disclose GCRs on the ADB's website. At the fund level, APDRF performance and lessons should be reviewed in advance of all fund replenishments.

[38] The grant closing report included sex-disaggregated data, which is rarely seen in APDRF closing report. It noted that 49% of beneficiaries were female and the grant ensured that food security and nutrition needs of women were met.

Appendixes

APPENDIX 1: THEORY OF CHANGE



☐ – scope of evaluation.

ADB = Asian Development Bank, COVID-19 = coronavirus disease, DMC = developing member country, DRR = disaster risk reduction.

Note: **Assumptions**. ADB's normal country programming operates in parallel to ADB's targeted disaster-related activities described in the theory of change and contributes to the overall goal of enhancing DMC resilience to disasters. In addition, DMCs' own disaster-related initiatives and support from other development partners contribute to this overall goal. The wider context includes global efforts on DRR including the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR). 2007. Hyogo Framework for Action, 2005–2015; UNDRR. 2015. Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015–2030; and initiatives from various actors to address post-disaster needs.

[a] ADB. 2021. *Revised Disaster and Emergency Assistance Policy*.

[b] ADB. 2008. *Action Plan for Implementing ADB's Disaster and Emergency Assistance Policy*.

[c] ADB. 2014. *Operational Plan for Integrated Disaster Risk Management 2014–2020*.

[d] ADB. 2019. *Operational Plan for Priority 3: Tackling Climate Change, Building Climate and Disaster Resilience, and Enhancing Environmental Sustainability, 2019–2024.*

Source: ADB (Independent Evaluation Department).

APPENDIX 2: ASIA PACIFIC DISASTER RESPONSE FUND BACKGROUND

A. Source of Financing

1. **Replenishment of the Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund (APDRF) has been regularly sourced from Asian Development Bank (ADB) net income.** Except for the initial contribution from uncommitted resources of the Asian Tsunami Fund in 2009 and the contribution from the Government of Japan in 2020, the APDRF has been replenished using uncommitted resources from ADB's previous year's net income. In particular, a total of $80 million or 41% of the total fund commitments has been sourced from ADB's net income (Table A2).

Table A2: Contributions to the Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund

Year	Source	Amount ($)
2009	Asian Tsunami Fund uncommitted resources	40,000,000
2015	ADB's 2014 net income	20,000,000
2017	ADB's 2016 net income	20,000,000
2020	ADB's 2019 net income	10,000,000
2020	Government of Japan	75,000,000
2021	ADB's 2020 net income	15,000,000
2024	ADB's 2023 net income	15,000,000
Total		**195,000,000**

ADB = Asian Development Bank.
Source: ADB (Climate Change and Sustainable Development Department).

B. Implementing Guidelines and Arrangements

2. **The implementing guidelines have been revised three times since establishment of the fund**. Supporting guidelines governing the provision and implementation of APDRF grants were originally issued in April 2009.[1] The guidelines were updated in July 2015,[2] including to allow for the application of retroactive financing for up to 30% of the grant amount, and the preparation of grant closing reports (GCRs). The guidelines were further revised in May 2021, providing for APDRF's support to address coronavirus disease (COVID-19), and then again in September 2022,[3] integrating the business process and fund disbursement for the second window that was established in 2021.[4] The timeline of the 2021 APDRF guidelines is shown in Figure A2. The second window aimed to finance experts to provide speedy post-disaster technical support for the preparation of post-disaster needs assessments (PDNAs), recovery plans, and post-disaster projects. The revisions were undertaken in years that the fund was reviewed or replenished (2015 and 2021).

[1] ADB. 2009. *Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund: Implementation Guidelines.*
[2] ADB. 2015. *Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund: Implementation Guidelines*.
[3] ADB. 2022. *Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund: Implementation Guidelines*.
[4] ADB. 2021. *Establishment of a Second Window of Assistance under the Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund.*

Figure A2: Timeline 2021 Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund Guidelines



ADB = Asian Development Bank, DG = director general, DMC = developing member country, GA = grant agreement, RD = regional department, TD = Treasury Department, VP = vice-president, WA = withdrawal application.
[a] Emergency conditions:
(i) A natural disaster has occurred in a DMC, and
(ii) an emergency has been officially declared that is of a scale beyond the capacity of the DMC government and its own agencies to meet the immediate expenses necessary to restore lifesaving services to the affected populations.
Source: Asian Development Bank. 2022. *Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund: Implementation Guidelines.*

3. **Approval of APDRF grants remained the same.** Under the different guidelines, ADB's President has the authority to approve APDRF grants through various channels. Typically, origination begins with the concerned ADB regional department director general, then to ADB's assigned disaster coordinator (for practical reasons this is usually the resident mission country director), and externally to the United Nations (UN) humanitarian and/or resident coordinator, who confirms the scale and implications of the disaster, and makes recommendations to the international community about the general amount and the nature of assistance required. Based on the response from the UN humanitarian and/or resident coordinator, ADB's disaster coordinator reverts to ADB's regional department director general, to the respective ADB operations vice president, and then to the ADB President. The President's approval is conveyed to the developing member country (DMC) together with (i) the grant agreement signed by ADB and ready for countersigning by the DMC; and (ii) the withdrawal application with the full amount of the grant.

4. **Management of the fund had evolved with the changes in the organization**. Within ADB, the responsibility for managing the APDRF was originally given to the Regional and Sustainable Development Department (the precursor to the current Climate Change and Sustainable Development Department [CCSD]). The head of the Disaster Risk Management Unit of the Climate Change, Resilience, and Environment Cluster, is now the APDRF Manager responsible for the day-to-day operations of the fund, including monitoring, evaluation, and reporting, with assistance from staff with relevant technical and administrative expertise. As fund manager, CCSD was responsible for coordinating closely with other ADB departments and resident mission disaster focal points with respect to activities to be supported by the APDRF. The official channel of communications between external APDRF contributors and ADB for the financial aspects and the lead in negotiations and discussions with contributors on procedural agreements for contributions to the fund was originally managed by ADB's Office of Cofinancing Operations; however, under the 2021 and 2022 guidelines, this responsibility was transferred to the Partner Funds Division of CCSD.

5. ADB's approval of the grant is valid for 30 days following the date of the letter and will lapse if the grant agreement is not signed within that period, unless extended. The grant agreement becomes effective on the date the grant agreement is signed by ADB, countersigned by the recipient government, and delivered at ADB headquarters. Unless otherwise agreed by ADB, the grant closing date is set at

6 months after the signing of the grant agreement. Disbursements are allowed for up to 100% of eligible costs (including applicable taxes and duties).

C. Eligibility and Use of the Fund

6. **Any DMC can access the APDRF in the event of a disaster**. Immediately after a disaster occurs in a DMC, ADB can enter into a legal agreement with the DMC's central government, which can allocate funds to local governments, government agencies, and other suitable national or international entities, including nongovernment organizations. Central government recipients are responsible for ensuring that use of the grant is in accordance with the provisions of the grant agreement.

7. **Conditions of assistance have become more flexible**. The establishment paper sets three eligibility criteria: (i) a natural disaster has occurred in the DMC, (ii) a statement of national emergency has been officially declared by the affected DMC, and (iii) the UN humanitarian and/or resident coordinator has confirmed the scale and implications of the disaster and has indicated a general amount of funding required to assist in alleviating the situation. The second criterion was revised in 2010 to require the declaration of a state of emergency beyond the capacity of the country and its own agencies to meet the immediate expenses necessary to restore lifesaving services to the affected populations.[5] The revised 2015 APDRF implementation guidelines provided more flexible and broader guidance, indicating that it could be deemed to have been met if a national government has approved the allocation of resources in support of the disaster response efforts and indicated that external assistance is welcome. This flexibility considers DMCs that lack legislation requiring the declaration of a state of emergency before national government resources can be approved to support the response efforts and international assistance can be requested; or when a government chooses not to declare a state of emergency following a major disaster because of valid strategic considerations, such as concerns for the country's tourism industry or business confidence, or if a disaster affects a region but not the whole country. This flexibility was intended to increase the speed and ease of disbursement while considering the concerns DMCs may have regarding their economy. Each distinct declaration of a disaster is regarded as a separate event and thus eligible for assistance, regardless of whether it occurred in the same disaster-affected DMC or in the same calendar year.

8. **Eligible items have changed slightly**. Under the original 2009 guidelines, APDRF grants could be used to procure goods, works, and services related to disaster response including but not limited to: (i) provision of emergency rescue equipment; (ii) provision of medical kits, food, and bottled drinking water; (iii) purchase of water purification and sanitation systems; (iv) provision of transitional shelter; (v) provision of personal hygiene kits; (vi) provision of temporary classrooms and teaching equipment; (vii) purchase of emergency communication equipment; (viii) debris sifting; (ix) site clearance; (x) safe disposal of useless rubble; and (xi) bulk purchase of aviation fuel. Under the 2015 revised guidelines, the provision of temporary classrooms and teaching equipment was no longer included. Further, under the 2021 and 2022 guidelines, the provision of medical care-related goods and equipment was added to facilitate support for addressing COVID-19.

9. **Retroactive financing was allowed starting 2015.** Retroactive financing of expenditures was not allowed under the 2009 APDRF guidelines because the fund was not designed to undertake activities that the emergency assistance loan provides. The fund was originally intended to bridge the gap between existing ADB arrangements that assist DMCs to reduce disaster risk, e.g., hazard mitigation loans and grants, and longer-term lending for post-disaster reconstruction. However, the 2015 revised guidelines permit retroactive financing of disaster relief costs up to a maximum of 30% of total grant proceeds, in line with the retroactive financing policy for emergency assistance financing under the DEAP. This option applies to expenditure incurred after the declaration of a state of emergency or the approval of national government resources in support of the disaster response efforts.

[5] ADB. 2010. *Amendment to Condition for Assistance of the Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund.*

10. **Starting 2020, the scope of the APDRF was expanded to cover health emergencies such as COVID-19 response projects**. In 2020, the APDRF received a $75.0 million tied contribution from the Government of Japan to help DMCs strengthen their capacity to contain the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. The contribution was made possible by a temporary 15-month waiver of the requirement that ADB only accept untied contributions to the fund and that contributions not be subject to any conditions. ADB approved its first COVID-19 Emergency Response grant for the Philippines (Grant 0685) in March 2020. During 2020–2024, the APDRF approved a total of 38 health (COVID-19) emergency grants totaling $62.5 million and covering 30 countries.

11. **Future APDRF support will finance post-disaster needs assessment**. In 2021, a second window of the APDRF was approved by the ADB Board, mainly to finance experts to provide speedy post-disaster technical support for the preparation of post-disaster needs assessment (PDNA) recovery plans and post-disaster projects. The second window will also enable ADB to participate more consistently in PDNAs as part of a multi-donor team and support the timely processing and startup of emergency assistance loans. The second window is not designed to finance technical support needs arising during post-disaster project implementation.

12. **The type of support has diversified**. The APDRF has traditionally been delivered in terms of grant support. Following establishment of the APDRF's second window in 2021, ADB has approved three direct charges in response to two disaster events: a $55,000 direct charge for conducting a PDNA for the Bangladesh flood in 2022, a $27,770 supplementary direct charge for the same disaster in 2023, and a $25,000 direct charge to address tropical cyclones Judy and Kevin in Vanuatu in 2023. The support facilitated the deployment of technical experts to work with governments in assessing damage and loss while setting priorities for recovery.

D. Disbursement

13. **APDRF was intended to be quick disbursing**. The APDRF funds are expected to be disbursed within 24 hours (except on holidays and weekends), upon receipt by ADB of the signed grant agreement and withdrawal application. As this is considered disaster response, speed and flexibility are essential. Disbursements are allowed for up to 100% of eligible costs (including applicable taxes and duties) using an advance account indicated in the withdrawal application. The entire approved grant amount is disbursed to the advance account in a single advance in accordance with the ADB Loan Disbursement Handbook (2022, as amended from time to time) and other related arrangements agreed upon between the recipient and ADB.

E. Procurement

14. **Because of the emergency nature of disaster events, APDRF procurement promotes the use of country systems to expedite delivery of needed goods and services.** APDRF resources can be used following procurement procedures suitable for emergency response. In recognition of the need to respond quickly to immediate needs following a disaster, to coordinate closely with other international organizations, and to facilitate work with potential cofinanciers, procurement of goods, works, and services is permitted both from ADB member and nonmember countries. The use of country systems in channeling and using grant funds contributes to alignment with government response priorities and increases response efficiency, to the extent that government systems function well.

15. ADB's Procurement Policy (2017, as amended from time to time) and the Procurement Regulations for ADB Borrowers (2017, as amended from time to time) do not apply. Procurement was undertaken by ADB for the COVID-19 Emergency Response (Grant 0685) to the Philippines, approved in 2020, which involved procurement of complete laboratory equipment of the Pandemic Sub-National Reference Laboratory, including reagents, test kits, consumables, and personal protective equipment; training of staff; and management of equipment, software, and hardware. Three other COVID-19

Emergency response grants—for Indonesia (Grant 0686), Pakistan (Grant 0694), and India (Grant 0717)—involved either direct transfer of grant funds to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) or execution of an administrative arrangement between ADB and UNICEF on a project basis to enable UNICEF to undertake the procurement for the government.

F. Cancellations

16. **On the whole, cancellations were minimal**. Of the 87 approved grants and 3 direct charges, 1 was partially cancelled, and 1 was fully cancelled. For the 2009 APDRF Grant 0162 to the Philippines, in response to Typhoon Ketsana (locally "Ondoy"), the government was unable to liquidate the full $3.00 million grant, which resulted in a partial cancellation and the return of $1.35 million (45.0% of the original approved amount). In 2010, the $3.00 million APDRF grant for the Indonesia Mount Merapi Disaster Response project (Grant 0237) was fully cancelled because of the failure by the executing agencies to (i) submit a detailed work plan or procurement plan, and (ii) justify its request to extend the grant closing date to 18 months. Cancellations total $4.35 million, or 3.0% of the total amount of grants approved during the evaluation period.

G. Reconciliation and Audit

17. **Actual use of the grant is subject to review and audit.** Within 4 months of the grant closing date, recipient governments are required to confirm the use of the grant through submission of a statement of expenditure with any outstanding advances to be refunded within a further 2 months. The government will retain underlying documentation, such as contracts, invoices, and receipts, while ADB reserves the right to review these documents. Reconciliation and audit by recipient governments often lead to extension and delays in closing of the grants.

18. The recipient's supreme audit institution or another audit firm acceptable to ADB is required to provide an audit report on the use of the grant, including the imprest account and the statement of expenditure, by the following deadlines: (i) for APDRF grants approved prior to the 2022 implementing guidelines, within 6 months of receipt of the statement of expenditure by ADB; and (ii) for APDRF grants approved after the issuance of the 2022 revised guidelines, within 6 months of the grant closing date. Audits of closed grants generally indicate that accounting records have been maintained in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles; that disbursements were implemented in accordance with the grant agreement; and that the grant was in compliance with the grant covenants.

H. Evaluation Evidence

19. **Submission of grant closing reports has been formally required following issuance of the updated implementing guidelines in July 2015**. Of the 63 grants approved after the GCR requirement was imposed in 2015, 31 GCRs have been submitted to CCSD; in addition, 2 GCRs and 4 brief implementation reports were received prior to the GCR requirement. This yields a total of 37 post-completion reports available for review. These post-completion reports cover 20 DMCs and 42% of APDRF grants and direct charges by number. None of the GCRs and brief implementation reports are publicly available. Interviews in the mission countries confirmed that no GCRs were shared with the respective country stakeholders, including the central government and the UN resident coordinators.

20. **Self-reviews assessed the performance of the fund as successful.** The APDRF has been subjected to two internal self-assessed fund-level reviews, which rated fund performance *successful*. The first review was undertaken by the Regional Sustainable Development Department in 2015 and covered the period from fund approval in April 2009 to December 2014.[6] The 2015 review covered 20 grants approved from

[6] ADB. 2015. *Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund: Review of Performance (April 2009-December 2014)*.

April 2009 to December 2014, which provided $39.7 million to 12 DMCs. A follow up review undertaken by the Sustainable Development and Climate Change Department in 2017[7] covers January 2015–December 2016 (eight APDRF grants totaling $16.2 million were approved for eight DMCs in that period); the review also addresses overall fund performance from April 2009–December 2016 (27 APDRF grants totaling $51.3 million, net of cancellations, were provided to 16 DMCs during that period). Both reviews did not assess the performance of the fund as a whole. However, both reviews noted that grants have generally performed well, and grant approval and effectiveness have been timely overall. The reviews also found that recipient governments regard the fund as a timely, flexible, and quick-disbursing source of stopgap financing in the immediate aftermath of disasters, which is of particular benefit because most international humanitarian support is provided in-kind. Both reviews served as a basis for the ADB Board's decision to replenish the fund. The fund performance reviews assessed the fund resources, allocations, timeliness, use of funds, liquidation, auditing, implementation arrangements and appropriateness of these arrangements, satisfaction of eligibility criteria, performance of eligibility criteria in targeting resources, the value-added contribution of the grants, and project impact. In both performance reviews, the fund was assessed overall *successful*. The 2015 performance review noted that the fund was aligned with ADB's strategies and policies, all government requests for support from the APDRF have been met, and APDRF grants have generally performed well. Grant approval and effectiveness were timely overall, and the APDRF implementation arrangements supported timely approval and provided room for adjustment in the use of resources in line with identified gaps in humanitarian support. For the 2017 performance review, the basis for the successful rating was the six GCRs available at the time of the review. Five of the six grants were rated successful or highly successful, and one grant was deemed partially successful due to a 5-month delay in providing cash transfers supported by the grant. The performance of both ADB and the executing agency were rated satisfactory with the exception of the recipient agency for the same grant that experienced the aforementioned delay.

21. Prior to this evaluation, the APDRF, at the fund level, has not been subjected to an independent evaluation, while at the project level, the GCRs were neither individually nor collectively evaluated by the Independent Evaluation Department. A special evaluation study in 2012 noted that with the APDRF, ADB has gradually expanded its relief support, even though ADB's mandate does not allow the institution to engage in peacemaking, peacekeeping, or humanitarian relief.[8]

[7] ADB. 2017. *Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund: Review of Performance (January 2015-December 2016)*.
[8] IED. 2012. *Special Evaluation Study: ADB's Response to Natural Disasters and Disaster Risks*. ADB.

APPENDIX 3: ASIA PACIFIC DISASTER RESPONSE FUND PORTFOLIO

1. From the establishment of the Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund (APDRF) in 2009 until the end of 2024, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) approved a total of 87 grants and 3 direct charges amounting to $146.6 million in 33 ADB developing member countries (DMCs).[1] This averages six projects per year or about $1.6 million per APDRF project. The volume of grant support ranged from as low as $100,000 to the $3 million limit.

A. Portfolio by Sector

2. **The APDRF has supported a range of sectors** (Figure A3.1)**.** While the fund was designed to immediately respond to disasters caused by natural hazards, 41 grants totaling $62 million supported the health sector, including APDRF grants that were used as a response to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic (43%). More than one-third (38%, totaling $55.5 million in 37 grants and 3 direct charges) went to public sector management, while the rest supported agriculture, natural resources, and rural development ($18.8 million in 8 grants, 13%) and the water and other urban infrastructure services sectors ($3 million in 1 grant, 2%).

Figure A3.1: ADB's Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund Approvals by Sector, 2009–2024
(%)



ADB = Asian Development Bank.
Source: ADB (Climate Change and Sustainable Development Department).

3. **Majority of APDRF funds covered health emergencies.** The major types of disaster supported by the APDRF include geological hazards (volcanic and earthquake-related activities), hydrometeorological hazards (drought, dzud, tropical cyclones, and floods), and health-related hazards (Figure A3.2). Health emergencies (including all COVID-19-related grants) comprised the largest APDRF approvals both in terms of number and amount approved. This is followed by extreme weather events: floods (17 projects, $33.0 million) and tropical cyclones (19 projects, $27.3 million). Geological hazards as well as hydrometeorological hazards (drought and dzud) had smaller shares.

[1] In October 2022, ADB approved an allocation for direct charge of $55,000 for the Severe Flood in North-East Region of Bangladesh. This was followed by a supplementary direct charge of $27,770 for the same disaster in 2023, and the Tropical Cyclone Judy and Tropical Cyclone Kevin for Vanuatu amounting to $25,000.

Figure A3.2: ADB's Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund Approvals by Hazard Type, 2009–2024
($ million)



ADB = Asian Development Bank.
[a]A dzud is a Mongolian term relating to winter climatic extremes associated with snowfall and temperature.
Source: ADB (Climate Change and Sustainable Development Department).

B. Portfolio by Region and Country

4. **In terms of number of grants, the Pacific region received the highest share, while the Southeast Asia region received the greatest volume.** Among the five ADB regional groups (Figure A3.3), the Pacific region received the greatest number of grants (43 grants or 48%), and ranked second in terms of volume ($35 million, 24%). Southeast Asia had the highest volume at $50.5 million, with 19 projects. East Asia (represented solely by Mongolia, because the People's Republic of China is not a recipient of the APDRF) received the smallest allocation (five grants, $9.8 million). At the country level, two DMCs in Southeast Asia received the highest volume of APDRF grants: the Philippines with $14 million and Indonesia with $12 million. In contrast, Pacific DMCs, such as the Cook Islands, Nauru, Niue, and Tuvalu, received the smallest share of APDRF grants with $1 million each, or less in the case of Niue. Factors that influence the size of the grant include: (i) geographical extent of the damage; (ii) initial estimate of deaths, injuries, and displaced persons; (iii) the response capacity of key government agencies in the country; and (iv) the date and magnitude of the last disaster that affected the country (thereby taking into account the cumulative effect of disasters on a country's ability to respond).

Figure A3.3: ADB's Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund Approvals by Region and Country, 2009–2024
($ million)



ADB = Asian Development Bank, ARM = Armenia, BAN = Bangladesh, BHU = Bhutan, CAM = Cambodia, COO = Cook Islands, DMC = developing member country, FIJ = Fiji, FSM = Federated States of Micronesia, GEO = Georgia, IND = India, INO = Indonesia, KAZ = Kazakhstan, KIR = Kiribati, MLD = Maldives, MON = Mongolia, MYA = Myanmar, NAU = Nauru, NEP = Nepal, NIU = Niue, PAK = Pakistan, PAL = Palau, PHI = Philippines, PNG = Papua New Guinea, RMI = Marshall Islands, SAM = Samoa, SOL = Solomon Islands, SRI = Sri Lanka, TAJ = Tajikistan, THA = Thailand, TIM = Timor-Leste, TON = Tonga, TUV = Tuvalu, UZB = Uzbekistan, VAN = Vanuatu, VIE = Viet Nam.
Note: Effective 1 February 2021, ADB placed a temporary hold on sovereign project disbursements and new contracts in Myanmar.
Source: ADB (Independent Evaluation Department and Climate Change and Sustainable Development Department).

APPENDIX 4: NATURAL DISASTERS IN ADB DEVELOPING MEMBER COUNTRIES, 2009–2024

Country	APDRF Grant[a]	Number of Disasters	Percentage of APDRF	Total Affected (million)
Afghanistan[b]	0	96	0%	28.98
Armenia	0	8	0%	0.10
Azerbaijan	0	5	0%	0.09
Bangladesh	2	74	3%	113.58
Bhutan	0	5	0%	0.02
Cambodia	2	22	9%	7.80
People's Republic of China	0	397	0%	715.55
Cook Islands	0	2	0%	0.00
Fiji	5	19	26%	1.50
Georgia	0	16	0%	0.50
India	0	248	0%	539.16
Indonesia	3	240	1%	33.70
Kazakhstan	0	14	0%	0.32
Kiribati	0	2	0%	0.00
Kyrgyz Republic	0	16	0%	2.10
Lao PDR	0	26	0%	3.04
Malaysia	0	46	0%	3.00
Maldives	0	4	0%	0.00
Marshall Islands	2	7	29%	0.06
Federated States of Micronesia	2	4	50%	0.30
Mongolia	3	23	13%	3.20
Myanmar[c]	2	45	4%	6.11
Nepal	2	62	3%	11.59
Pakistan	2	103	2%	78.38
Palau	1	5	20%	0.02
Papua New Guinea	1	33	3%	3.51
Philippines	3	263	1%	179.17
Samoa	2	5	40%	0.02
Solomon Islands	1	18	6%	0.30
Sri Lanka	3	64	5%	12.01
Tajikistan	0	31	0%	0.10
Thailand	1	72	1%	53.88
Timor-Leste	1	6	17%	0.30
Tonga	2	12	17%	0.20
Tuvalu	0	4	0%	0.02
Uzbekistan	0	4	0%	0.07
Vanuatu	5	17	29%	1.08
Viet Nam	3	116	3%	28.63
Total	**53**	**2,134**	**2%**	**1,828.39**

ADB = Asian Development Bank, APDRF = Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund.

[a] This excludes health emergency-related grants (i.e., for coronavirus disease [COVID-19] response).

[b] ADB placed its regular assistance to Afghanistan on hold effective 15 August 2021.

[c] Effective 1 February 2021, ADB placed a temporary hold on sovereign project disbursements and new contracts in Myanmar.

Sources: ADB (Climate Change and Sustainable Development Department) and EM-DAT International Disasters Database.

APPENDIX 5: PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT SUPPORTING INFORMATION

1. The average number of days to process Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund grants by department and by type of disaster is provided in Figures A5.1. and A5.2. The number of approved Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund projects by country group is in Figure A5.3.

Figure A5.1: Average Number of Days to Process APDRF Grants from Request to Disbursement by ADB Regional Department, 2009–2024



ADB = Asian Development Bank, APDRF = Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund, CWRD = Central and West Asia Department, EARD = East Asia Department, PARD = Pacific Department, SARD = South Asia Department, SERD = Southeast Asia Department.
Source: ADB (Climate Change and Sustainable Development Department).

Figure A5.2: Average Number of Days to Process APDRF Grants from Request to Disbursement, by Disaster Type, 2009–2024



APDRF = Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund.
Source: Asian Development Bank (Climate Change and Sustainable Development Department).

Figure A5.3: Number of Approved APDRF Projects by ADB Country Group, 2009–2024



ADB = Asian Development Bank, APDRF = Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund.
Note: A = concessional assistance only; B = ordinary capital resources blend; and C = ordinary capital resources only.
Source: ADB (Climate Change and Sustainable Development Department).