The 2012-2017 evaluation did not find out whether PBOs took place in conjunction with debt reduction or relief support programs by other donors. Instead, it assessed the relevance of PBOs within AfDB’s portfolio and the extent to which they adhered to its own policy and guidelines as well as international good practices. Macroeconomic stability is one of the conditions for PBO eligibility, as AfDB needs to considers debt sustainability. The aim is to ensure that loan conditions do not compromise the debt sustainability of recipient countries. 

Cooperation with Multilateral Development Banks and the International Monetary Fund 

AfDB has made substantial progress in its use of PBOs. In 1999, it was heavily dependent on the World Bank and to a lesser extent the IMF for the analysis and design of its PBOs. The only instruments available to AfDB were structural and sectoral adjustment operations, which often encountered implementation difficulties and delays resulting from weak country ownership and unsuccessful attempts to leverage policy change using complex conditionalities. 

The evaluation of PBOs in 2018 highlighted how AfDB had coordinated with other development partners, most notably in the identification and appraisal periods. AfDB staff give high importance to coordination and invest in upfront work with other development partners. However, the evaluation also found that AfDB had found it difficult to sustain these initial high levels of coordination throughout the implementation phase. AfDB’s approach was in line with the G20 Principles for Effective Coordination between the IMF and MDBs on Policy-Based Lending in 2017, which proposed that all MDBs align behind the IMF with regard to countries facing macroeconomic vulnerability. 

Harmonization with other development partners was one of the 2012 policy’s five PBO eligibility criteria and is also considered core to international good practice. Nevertheless, the guidelines make it clear that “the criterion of harmonization does not prevent AfDB from providing PBOs when no other development partner is doing so. Indeed, in such cases, teams are expected to consider the potential of the PBO to leverage other support and influence. With regards to coordination with the IMF in particular, expectations have recently changed.” 

At the identification and appraisal stages, AfDB’s efforts to coordinate with other development partners were rated satisfactory in 82% of cases. Such coordination was clearest in the 23% of PBOs which made use of joint performance assessment frameworks (PAFs). Where PAFs did not exist, and even in cases where AfDB was the only partner to provide assistance in the form of budget support, sound justifications and evidence of coordination were found. For example, in Chad, AfDB worked closely with the European Union and the World Bank, including through joint missions during the first Public Finance Reform Support Programme, although the practice was not fully sustained under the second. In Ghana, the joint budget support framework had broken down by the time the Public Financial Management and Private Sector Competitiveness Support Programme (PFMPSC) was appraised; however, AfDB’s decision to provide a PBO and to work closely with IMF and the World Bank was well justified. 

In the context of in-depth PBO assessments, a consistent theme on coordination emerged. Coordination was strong during the identification and appraisal stage where the concerned government took up its leadership role, but was not always maintained throughout implementation. Around two-thirds of survey respondents had a positive view of AfDB’s coordination with other development partners, although views were slightly more positive among AfDB staff than among RMC officials. Egypt provides an example of good practice in terms of coordination between the AfDB and the World Bank, since the coordination that began at identification and appraisal continued into implementation.25
 Although the IMF program was not in place by the time AfDB approved the first a series of PBOs, it followed soon after and there was regular liaison between the three institutions during the planning stages. In the Seychelles, appraisal for the first in a series of PBOs for both the AfDB and the World Bank was closely linked to the IMF’s assessment, and the government took the lead in bringing the development partners together to support related reform programs, but this coordination was not sustained in later years. 

There have been cases where AfDB has proceeded with a PBO in the absence of an on-track IMF program before the G20 principles were adopted. These included three countries that did not have an IMF program: two are MICs (Angola and Nigeria) and one is a transition state (Comoros, although the PBO was not CRBS).26
 In addition to the in-depth PBO assessments, the desk review highlighted that in Algeria, Comoros, and Mauritania, IMF programs were not on track but an IMF letter of comfort and/or notes on the country’s relationship with IMF through Article IV consultation were included in the appraisal package.

• 25
  
  With the exception that, for the third phase, the two institutions are now running on different schedules, since AfDB faced some delays, which reduced the extent to which it has been possible to conduct missions jointly.
• 26
  
  This figure does not include Egypt since the IMF program was agreed shortly after PBO approval.